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Empirical studies reveal a surprisingly wide variety of pricing strategies among retailers, even among Internet
sellers of undifferentiated homogeneous goods, such as books and music CDs. Several empirical findings remain
puzzling; for example, within the same market, some small retailers decide to discount deeply, whereas others forgo
the price-sensitive switchers and price high. The authors present theoretical and empirical analyses that address
these varied pricing strategies. A model of three asymmetric firms shows that under multiple switcher segments, in
which different switchers compare prices at different retailers, firm-specific loyalty is not sufficient to explain the
variety of pricing strategies. The authors demonstrate that a retailer’s strategy to discount deeply or frequently is
driven by the ratio of the size of switcher segments for which the retailer competes to its loyal segment size. The
relative switcher-to-loyal ratios among retailers explain situations in which a small retailer finds it optimal to price
high, despite having few loyals, or to discount and go for the switchers. The results of two empirical studies confirm
the model’s predictions for varied pricing strategies in the context of Internet booksellers. The analyses also present
several implications. A small retailer can sometimes benefit from strategically limiting its access to switchers to
soften price competition. A midsized retailer can benefit from targeting its switcher acquisition activities toward its
larger rival, given the shallower discounts involved. When most switchers widely compare prices, a large retailer
should offer few shallow discounts because other firms will more aggressively discount. The importance of switcher
segmentation suggests that managers should carefully measure switching behavior in devising pricing strategies.
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Customers who know the price of only one retailer are
uninformed or “loyal” customers, whereas customers who
know the prices of all retailers are “switchers.” Urbany,
Dickson, and Kalapurakal (1996) report various reasons
more than half of grocery customers compare prices across
retailers, and “cherry-picking” customers tend to benefit
from going store to store for specials (Fox and Hoch 2005).
Because a small firm has relatively few loyal customers, it
typically has more incentive than a large firm to discount
and attract the switchers. However, some small retailers
decide to price high and sell only to their loyal or niche seg-
ment of customers. Although this strategy may be appealing
for specialized or highly differentiated goods, it is unclear
why a small retailer would price higher than a larger rival
for a homogeneous good, such as a book. Clay, Krishnan,
and Wolff (2001) report these types of “puzzling” Internet
retailers in their empirical analyses—namely, small and
undifferentiated firms that, nevertheless, charge relatively
high prices. In general, Internet retailers exhibit consider-
able price dispersion as firms discount or price high, often
in ways that are inconsistent with theoretical predictions
(Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar 2004).
Especially problematic for conventional price promo-
tion theories is the observation of some small retailers with
heavy discounting and others with a high-price strategy in
the same homogeneous goods market. Previewing our
empirical analyses of Internet booksellers, both Worthy and
a1Books are small retailers with similar Internet reach and
site popularity. They sell many of the same books (a1Books
carries 90% of the books carried by Worthy in our sample)
and also compete with the larger retailers, such as Amazon.
Internet retailing offers consumers considerable choicesin terms of where to shop and purchase. For example, asearch of several products on mySimon, a popular price
comparison engine, reveals more than three dozen retailers
for online books, more than 70 retailers offering printers,
and more than 100 digital camera retailers. Many of these
retailers are small compared with the big players in the
category. For example, the Internet book retailer a1Books
has less than 1% of the reach (number of viewers who visit
the site) of Barnesandnoble.com (B&N). There are dozens
of similarly small Internet booksellers that compete with
one another and the considerably larger firms of Amazon.
com and B&N for a wide assortment of books. What char-
acterizes the price promotion strategies among these many
large and small retailers?
In general, frequent discounting by small firms is con-
sistent with extant theory (e.g., Narasimhan 1988; Raju,
Srinivasan, and Lal 1990). Customers are conceptualized to
possess different information for comparison shopping.
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1Prior models have been applied to both brand and retailer com-
petition. We model retailers given our focus on homogeneous
goods and to be consistent with the context of our empirical
setting.
com, on a wide variety of books. Despite such similarities,
a1Books discounts heavily whereas Worthy typically has
high prices that exceed those of both a1Books and Amazon.
com. What explains these fundamental pricing differences
among small retailers? How frequently do large retailers
offer shallow or deep discounts? We present theoretical and
empirical analyses that examine various observed price pro-
motion strategies, such as in Internet retailing.
We address two fundamental shortcomings of conven-
tional price promotion models: (1) The duopoly structure
can be limited in the various price promotion strategies that
are considered, and (2) switchers are usually assumed to be
homogeneous in that they know the prices of all retailers.
Retailer price promotion strategies from the standard duop-
oly approach (small versus large retailers) are driven by dif-
ferent loyal segment sizes and homogeneous switchers who
compare all prices.1 We present a model of an asymmetric
triopoly (three firms) that includes multiple “switcher seg-
ments,” in which switchers compare prices at different
retailers. Markets involving several asymmetric firms may
prove more insightful and reflective of actual market condi-
tions than the conventional duopoly. Furthermore, in the
context of multiple retailers, there may be multiple seg-
ments of “partially informed” switchers in addition to the
typical switchers who compare prices for all retailers. Even
in an Internet setting, in which retailers proliferate and
many shoppers use price comparison engines, not all
switchers will be exhaustive price comparison machines.
For example, many online book customers may compare
prices between the two larger firms, Amazon.com and
B&N, while ignoring smaller retailers such as a1Books.
Recent studies indicate that, on average, online shoppers
visit only 1.2–1.4 booksellers (Johnson et al. 2004; Mont-
gomery et al. 2004). Even the use of price comparison
“shopbots” remains relatively low, given the various cogni-
tive costs of evaluating many alternatives (Montgomery et
al. 2004). Consumers are more likely to visit Internet retail-
ers they trust because of an assortment of factors (e.g., Bart
et al. 2005). If some customers prefer to compare prices
only among trusted stores whereas other customers com-
pare prices from multiple listed retailers, switcher segments
with different types of price comparison behavior will
occur. Therefore, the realistic assumption is that switchers
are segmented because they compare a subset of retailer
prices. By including segmented switchers in an asymmetric
triopoly, our model derives a more complete set of promo-
tion strategies that are not predicted under asymmetric
duopolies.
Prior theoretical models, based largely on the work of
Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988), report varied results
for promotional activity under different conditions. Raju,
Srinivasan, and Lal (1990) conclude that the average dis-
count offered by the stronger brand (greater loyalty) is
larger than the average discount offered by the weaker
brand (less loyalty), but Rajiv, Dutta, and Dhar (2002) reach
2Narasimhan (1988) considers several cases in which the fre-
quency and depth of discount changes according to switchers’
brand preferences. For homogeneous goods, we compare our
results with Narasimhan’s basic results.
a different conclusion. Findings also differ about price pro-
motion frequency. Narasimhan (1988) and Raju, Srinivasan,
and Lal (1990) conclude that the promotional frequency of
the stronger brand is less than that of the weaker brand.2
Rajiv, Dutta, and Dhar (2002) conclude that high-service
stores (as an analogue to a strong brand) promote more fre-
quently under promotional advertising. Small retailers seem
to promote with less intensity, though discount prices may
have a higher expected payout to smaller stores (Hoch,
Drèze, and Purk 1994; Shankar and Bolton 2004). The high
versus low pricing dichotomy does not often fit the rich pro-
motional strategies observed empirically (e.g., Bolton and
Shankar 2003). There is a need for research that addresses
these price promotion variations, particularly for the pricing
strategies of small retailers.
We consider a homogeneous goods market with three
firms that are asymmetrical in loyals and switchers, and our
results clarify the varied price promotion strategies in equi-
librium. For example, we show that a firm can adopt a “par-
titioned” pricing strategy that combines frequent, shallow
discounts to compete with a higher-priced firm and infre-
quent, deep discounts to compete with a lower-priced firm.
Our results also explain a situation in which a small firm is
better off pricing high with little discounting, despite pos-
sessing few loyals. In general, our model not only encom-
passes a three-firm extension of prior duopoly models but
also explains previously ambiguous situations, such as
when a retailer has both few loyals and few switchers.
Our specific research questions include the following:
How do multiple, asymmetric firms compete for multiple
switcher and loyal segments? How do firms differ in their
price dispersion, including the frequency and depth of their
promotions, in terms of their loyal and switcher customer
bases? and Why do some small retailers price high and oth-
ers offer deep discounts? Our results demonstrate that a
retailer’s pricing is driven by the ratio of switchers for
which the retailer competes to its loyal segment size. The
retailers’ relative switcher-to-loyal ratios (SLRs) explain
when a large or small firm is more or less inclined to dis-
count deeply or frequently or when a small firm with few
loyals is better off pricing high.
We test our model’s predictions with two empirical
studies, using pricing data for numerous Internet book
retailers for more than 1600 books. The two studies differ in
how an empirical measure is formed for a retailer’s SLR
(the key variable of the model). The first study is
exploratory, using publicly available descriptive data for the
retailers. The second study uses comScore data of Internet
browsing and purchase data for 100,000 panelists. Com-
pared with the exploratory study, the panel data study has
the advantage of more directly measuring switching and
loyal behaviors; the disadvantage is that fewer retailers are
represented. The empirical results for both studies confirm
the model’s predictions for retailer pricing based on the
SLR, adding a new perspective to previous studies of dis-
persed prices (Baye and Morgan 2001; Burdett and Judd
1983; Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal 1990; Salop and Stiglitz
1977).
We organize the remainder of this article as follows: We
present our model, highlighting the strategic intuition in
detail and contrasting our results with prior models. We also
formulate several hypotheses from the model’s results. We
then describe our empirical studies and the results. We con-
clude with managerial implications and suggestions for fur-
ther research.
Model and Analysis
Our model builds on the work of Narasimhan (1988) and
Varian (1980). Whereas Varian considers many symmetric
firms and Narasimhan studies two asymmetric firms, we
analyze a market with three asymmetric firms and multiple
switcher segments. Switcher segments among multiple,
asymmetric firms are not components of prior models,
which makes our research unique. For conventional retail-
ers, it is easy to imagine that not all customers will be
informed of all prices because of the high cost associated
with searching prices. In an Internet setting, however,
search costs are relatively low. We can reasonably assume
that at least some customers are highly informed about
online prices, even for low-cost items (Carlton and Cheva-
lier 2001; Koças¸ 2002; Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001).
However, this assumption does not preclude multiple seg-
ments of switchers who do not compare prices among every
retailer. Even with price comparison engines, not all retail-
ers are listed, and not all customers use price comparison
sites (Iyer and Pazgal 2003; Montgomery et al. 2004).
Asymmetric awareness of retailers by price-sensitive
switchers may lead to different pricing strategies (Pan,
Ratchford, and Shankar 2004).
The fundamental intuition behind our model is that mul-
tiple switcher segments can lessen price competition among
firms (for a model of price competitiveness in the context of
consumer search costs, see Lal and Sarvary 1999). Firms
with greater motivation to discount, because of a smaller
loyal segment size and/or a greater number of switchers to
potentially serve, will more actively compete for the fully
informed switchers. This leaves firms with fewer relevant
switchers for a given loyalty size to focus on their loyals
and the subset of switchers who consider them in their price
comparison search. In such cases, prices will typically be
higher than they would be if the firm were to compete for
all switchers. Other firms discount less in reaction to these
higher prices, and thus the severity of price competition
becomes less overall. Under some conditions, the firm with
the fewest loyals can be the highest-priced firm, a result that
asymmetric loyalty by itself cannot implement. Our model
predictions reflect a wide variance in retailers’ price disper-
sions, consistent with empirical observations.
Consider a market for a homogeneous good, such as a
specific book or music CD, sold by three retailers. On the
demand side, each customer purchases a single unit of the
good if it is offered at or below the reservation price r,
which is assumed to be homogeneous for all customers and
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3A common reservation price is a typical assumption (Iyer and
Pazgal 2003; Narasimhan 1988; Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal 1990;
Varian 1980). Narasimhan (1988) considers a case in which con-
sumers have different reservation prices for brands.
4Consumers may choose not to compare a specific retailer’s
prices for several reasons, such as a lack of awareness or a lack of
trust in the retailer. Our definition of switcher segments is based
fundamentally on the set of retailers among which the switcher
price compares. A dynamic extension to our model with endoge-
nous segment sizes may take different forms depending on
whether price comparisons are dependent on awareness or trust.
We thank a reviewer for raising these distinctions.
across all retailers.3 We model different segments of both
loyal customers who buy from their preferred retailer as
long as the price does not exceed r and switchers who com-
parison shop. The loyal customers are faithful to only one
firm; the number of customers who are loyal to Firm i is ni.
Without loss of generality, we assume that n1 > n2 > n3. We
also assume the existence of two switcher segment sizes,
s123 and s12, whose members are not loyal to any firm but
rather buy from the lowest-priced retailer among those they
compare. Switcher segment s123 is fully informed, meaning
that its members compare prices quoted by all three firms.
Switcher segment s12 compares prices quoted only by the
larger Firms 1 and 2. Although these partially informed
switchers do not compare all retailer prices, they still com-
pare the prices from the best-recognized retailers, which
may have the largest reach and the most active communica-
tion channels.4 Firms 1 and 2 would be like B&N and
Amazon.com (the biggest online booksellers), whereas
Firm 3 would be like a1Books. Although some switchers
will compare prices at all three retailers (s123), a1Books has
less than 1% of B&N’s reach, so there are likely to be other
switchers who are unfamiliar with a1Books and compare
only Amazon.com and B&N (s12).
We normalize the market size to one (n1 + n2 + n3 +
s12 + s123 = 1) without loss of generality. Although the seg-
ment sizes and the reservation price are common knowl-
edge, because of imperfect addressability and targetability,
retailers cannot price discriminately (Blattberg and
Deighton 1991; Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang 2001). All
firms face constant fixed and marginal costs, which we
assume to be zero without loss of generality (Iyer and Paz-
gal 2003; Narasimhan 1988; Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal
1990). Overall, the model and its assumptions are similar to
Narasimhan’s (1988) model and other related models,
except for analyses of three firms and two switcher
segments.
In an effort to capture switcher segments, firms have an
incentive to undercut the price of other firms that are com-
peting for those switchers, a tendency that results in a
downward push in prices. Motivation also exists to price at
the reservation price, in case the switchers cannot be served
with a lower price. A retailer’s “minimum price” makes the
firm indifferent between selling only to its niche of loyal
customers at the reservation price and selling to its switcher
segments, given it is the lowest-priced firm at the minimum
price. A firm will never discount below its minimum price,
because it could then do better by focusing on its loyal cus-
tomers. A firm’s smaller loyal segment size and larger
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FIGURE 1
Equilibrium Prices in P1, Illustrated for s123 = s12
A: PDFs
B: CDFs
switcher segment size provide a greater incentive to forgo
selling only to the loyals. We define a firm’s ratio of
switcher-to-loyal segment sizes, φi, as φ3 = s123/n3, φ2 =
(s123 + s12)/n2, and φ1 = (s123 + s12)/n1. Under segments s123
and s12, Firms 1 and 2 compete for the same switchers, so
Firm 2 always has a higher SLR (or φi) than Firm 1, given
Firm 2’s smaller loyal segment. However, Firm 3 can only
capture switcher segment s123, so its SLR may be higher or
lower than that of both firms. Thus, Firm 3 may discount
deeply to capture the switchers or play only its niche loyal
segment and charge higher prices. Without multiple
switcher segments, the relative order of φi for these firms
would strictly be a function of the loyal segment sizes, as in
prior models. Thus, our recognition of segmented switchers
changes the nature of a retailer’s incentive to discount.
A more general consideration of segmented switchers
(adding s23 and s13 switcher segments) does not change the
model’s intuition or conclusions. Additional switcher seg-
ments modify the degree of a retailer’s relative incentive to
discount, but the pricing equilibrium remains a function of
retailers’ SLRs and their rank order. Generalizing to more
than three asymmetric retailers also gives results that are
similar to a triopoly (details are available on request). Thus,
our model focuses on three firms and two switcher seg-
ments for relative tractability.
Equilibrium Price Promotion Strategies
The tension of selling to switchers and loyals results in a
lack of pure strategies typical of such models. Therefore,
we solve for a mixed-strategy equilibrium that depends on
the relative sizes of the loyal and switcher segments. A
mixed strategy can be interpreted as arising from a retailer’s
uncertainty about the pricing decisions of competing retail-
ers (Gibbons 1992). Equilibrium prices are defined by a
probability density function (PDF) that indicates the range
of prices a retailer may charge (the retailer’s price support).
We find that equilibrium price promotion strategies funda-
mentally depend on the retailers’ relative SLRs. Thus, we
present the mixed-strategy equilibrium for the case that is
more typical of prior models, in which the large Firm 1 has
the lowest φi, as follows:
P1: When φ3 > φ1, Firms 1 and 3 have mutually exclusive price
ranges that, when combined, form Firm 2’s price range.
Firm 2 competes with Firm 3 in the lower part of its price
range and with Firm 1 in the upper part of its price range
(for a proof, see the Appendix).
The PDF and the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) for the equilibrium prices appear in Figure 1. Firm 2
has greater motivation to compete for s123 than Firm 1, and
because Firm 3 can only capture s123, the competition
between Firms 2 and 3 is fairly intense. The low prices Firm
2 quotes while trying to capture s123 make it easier for Firm
2 to sell to s12. Thus, there is no guarantee that Firm 1 will
capture any switchers, even at its minimum price, because
the other two firms already compete for s123 at lower prices.
Therefore, Firm 1 is less inclined to discount. The more
intense competition between Firms 2 and 3 makes the lower
bound of Firm 1’s price range move up to the point in equi-
librium at which Firm 1 no longer directly competes for
s123. Thus, Firm 1’s and Firm 3’s equilibrium price ranges
do not overlap. Moreover, when Firm 2 prices below Firm 1
to compete with Firm 3 for segment s123, it also always
serves segment s12. That is, in the price region in which
only Firms 2 and 3 compete, s12 effectively becomes a com-
ponent of Firm 2’s loyal segment. Because an effectively
larger loyal segment means that Firm 2 now has more to
lose from price cuts, the lowest price that Firm 2 can prof-
itably quote increases, which lessens the severity of the
price competition with Firm 3. Thus, the lowest price sup-
port for Firms 2 and 3 rises above the minimum prices
of both firms.
These results emerge mainly because of asymmetry in
both the switcher and the loyal segment sizes. The lowest
prices are higher in our model than in Varian’s (1980),
Narasimhan’s (1988), and other models that lack multiple
switcher segments. The existence of s12 as a switcher seg-
ment that omits Firm 3 leads to higher average prices for
Firms 2 and 3, and their competition for segment s123 leads
to higher average prices for Firm 1. At the extreme of s12 =
0 (where φ3 > φ2), the results represent a three-firm exten-
sion of Narasimhan’s model, similar to other models of
asymmetric oligopoly (Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries
1992; Koças¸ and Kiyak 2006).
We find that the equilibrium of P1 does not change,
regardless of whether Firm 3’s SLR exceeds that of Firm 2.
The intuition is straightforward; the lower price support for
(p )imin
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Firms 2 and 3 rises above their respective minimum prices.
Therefore, the equilibrium is unaffected by whether the
minimum prices of Firms 2 and 3 switch order, because nei-
ther is part of the equilibrium price ranges for those two
firms. Furthermore, although Firm 2 may have the highest
SLR, it still sets its lower price support partially in response
to Firm 1’s higher support, because Firm 1 forgoes compe-
tition for s123. Firm 1’s main issue is that both Firms 2 and
3 have higher SLRs, regardless of whose is greater.
P1 contrasts remarkably with the case in which Firm 3
has the (weakly) lowest SLR, or φ3 ≤ φ1 (recall that φ2 >
φ1). In this situation, Firm 3 lacks sufficient discount moti-
vation to capture its switcher segment and thus becomes a
high-priced niche retailer focusing on its loyal segment.
Because Firm 1’s SLR is not the lowest, it finds that it is
worthwhile to play for s123. Segments s12 and s123 implicitly
combine into a single switcher segment that only Firms 1
and 2 serve. The resultant equilibrium is defined as follows:
P2: When φ3 ≤ φ1, only Firms 1 and 2 discount, whereas Firm
3’s price is set at the reservation price r (for a proof, see
the Appendix).
The PDFs and CDFs for the equilibrium prices appear
in Figure 2. The lower price support is defined by Firm 1’s
minimum price because Firm 2 never needs to discount
below this to compete for the switchers. Firm 3 is content to
be a niche player, pricing high to serve only its relatively
small loyal segment. Given that n1 > n3, the P2 condition
that φ3 ≤ φ1 essentially represents the case in which s123 is
small compared with s12 (s123 = 0 will always meet the con-
dition of P2). Firm 3 recognizes that most of the switchers
compare prices only between Firms 1 and 2, so Firm 3
becomes a high-priced retailer.
Model Discussion
Before turning to the empirical validation of our model, we
describe in more detail the firms’ profits and prices in the
presence of segmented switchers (for a summary, see Table
1). With a partially informed switcher segment s12 included,
average prices and profits are generally higher because the
price supports increase as Firm 1 “abandons” s123 under P1.
Thus, multiple switcher segments tend to reduce competi-
tion because not all firms are able to capture all switchers.
The relative sizes of the switcher segments shape the
nature of competition between the firms. Under P1, as Fig-
ure 3, Panel A, depicts, Firm 1’s discount deepens as s12
exceeds s123 (when the total number of switchers is held
constant). However, when the size of the fully informed
segment increases, so does the severity of competition
between Firms 2 and 3. This increased competition for seg-
ment s123 pushes Firm 2’s and Firm 3’s discounts deeper
(Figure 3, Panel B). At the same time, it forces Firm 1 to
offer shallower discounts because Firm 2 already serves
more of segment s12 (in expectation) with its deeper dis-
counts. Thus, the composition of switchers fundamentally
affects when retailers should offer frequent or infrequent
deep or shallow discounts.
When we compare firms’ profits as the composition of
switcher segments varies, we first observe that Firm 1 is
indifferent because it always receives the guaranteed profit
(nir). Firm 2’s profits increase when s12 increases at the
expense of s123, given that segment s12 acts as a second-
degree loyal segment to Firm 2. A more notable result per-
tains to the profits of Firm 3 under P1. Firm 3 can benefit
Figure 2
Equilibrium Prices in P2
A: PDFs
B: CDFs
TABLE 1
Summary of Equilibrium Results in P1 and P2
P1 ( ) P2 ( )
Profits Lowest Price Profits Lowest Price
Firm 1 n1r n1r
Firm 2
Firm 3 n3r rp p2 3≥ min( )n s s p n r3 12 123 2 3+ + >
p1min( ) minn s s p n r2 12 123 1 2+ + >p p2 2≥ min( )n s p n r2 12 1 2+ >
p1minp p1 1> min
φ φ3 1≤φ φ3 1>
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FIGURE 3
Depth and Frequency of Promotions
A: Size of the Fully Informed Switcher Segment Is
Smaller Than the Size of the Partially Informed Switcher
Segment (s123 < s12; P1)
B: Size of the Fully Informed Switcher Segment Is
Larger Than the Size of the Partially Informed Switcher
Segment (s123 > s12; P1)
5Firm 3’s profits for at least some positive region of s12 are
higher than its profits at s12 = 0. More specifically, as long as the
total number of switchers remains above a modest threshold, Firm
3’s profit has a positive slope at s12 = 0+, such that there is at least
some positive s12 in which Firm 3 is better off.
from a positive s12 customer base as long as the higher price
support more than compensates for the loss of some s123
customers as s12 increases. In general, Firm 3’s profits do
not reach a maximum when all switchers belong to s123.5
Thus, Firm 3 may strategically choose to limit its exposure
to switchers (lowering s123 and increasing s12) to make Firm
2 focus more on its competition with Firm 1. That is, Firm 3
benefits from a more balanced distribution of switchers, a
condition that places Firm 2 in a more balanced considera-
tion for both switcher segments. Thus, our model comple-
ments Iyer and Pazgal’s (2003) and Baye and Morgan’s
(2001) results, which pertain to retailers belonging (or not)
to Internet agents that facilitate price comparisons. By con-
sidering various-sized switcher segments, our model points
to a small retailer potentially benefiting from some degree
of price comparison strictly between the larger or better-
known firms. This result further highlights the competitive
nature of the asymmetric triopoly. Firm 3’s prices and prof-
its depend critically on how Firms 1 and 2 compete with
each other for its switcher segment.
When the relative size of the fully informed switcher
segment is small, Firm 3 may prefer to ignore the switchers
completely and offer no discounts at all (P2). This result
represents an important distinction between our segmented-
switcher model and other models of asymmetric loyalty.
When multiple switcher segments exist, loyal segment sizes
are not sufficient to describe the nature of competition
among the various firms. The relative sizes of the switcher
segments must also be considered because they affect the
SLRs (φi) among the firms. Thus, a small firm may discount
or price high to play its niche, depending on its relative
SLR.
Comparison with Prior Models
Our model complements various prior findings for promo-
tion frequency and depth. In terms of promotion frequency,
in general, P1 results follow the work of Narasimhan (1988)
and Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal (1990) in that they predict
that a strong retailer (one with greater loyalty) promotes
less frequently. However, our model also predicts that a
strong retailer can promote more frequently if it has rela-
tively more interest in the switchers than the weaker retail-
ers have (e.g., Firm 1 promotes more often than Firm 3
under P2). Narasimhan notes that a strong brand may be
promoted more frequently (with shallower discounts) if
switchers prefer that brand, whereas our results pertain to
the switcher segment sizes rather than brand or retailer pref-
erence. Rajiv, Dutta, and Dhar (2002) conclude that a high-
service (i.e., strong) store offers advertised sales more fre-
quently, albeit to build traffic. The results of P2 concur with
the predictions of Rajiv, Dutta, and Dhar, even in the
absence of traffic considerations, suggesting that a rela-
tively larger size of switchers targeted by high-service
stores can explain a higher frequency of advertised sales.
In the case of promotion depth, recall that Narasimhan
(1988), Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal (1990), and Rajiv, Dutta,
and Dhar (2002) all examine asymmetric duopolies. Under
their respective models, Narasimhan suggests that the two
stores offer the same depth of discounts (for indifferent
switchers); Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal predict that the
stronger (or larger) store should offer deeper discounts; and
Rajiv, Dutta, and Dhar predict that the stronger store should
offer shallower discounts. Our model of segmented switch-
ers predicts the conditions under which a store may offer
deeper or shallower discounts. More specifically, a strong
store may indeed offer shallower discounts if it has the least
motivation to promote, as characterized by its smaller SLR
(P1). A strong store may also offer the same discount depth
as a smaller store if no other weak firms compete for
switchers (P2; Firms 1 and 2). A strong store may even offer
deeper discounts than a weak store if its share of switchers
is relatively larger than that of the weak store (P2; Firms 1
and 2 compared with Firm 3). Thus, our three-firm model
with segmented switchers encompasses various cases of
prior duopoly models.
Iyer and Pazgal (2003) present a model of many firms
(as in Varian 1980) with switchers and asymmetric loyalty,
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6Mixed strategies in pricing are usually assumed to be observ-
able through temporal price dispersion (Narasimhan 1988; Varian
1980) that is pooled across multiple products and retailers (e.g.,
Iyer and Pazgal 2003; Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal 1990). Data for
multiple products (in our case, books) represent repeated observa-
tions of a mixed pricing strategy over time. Our analysis is consis-
tent with this view in that we define “discount” in terms of tempo-
ral price changes, and we consider a retailer’s average discounting
behavior across books. Therefore, the hypotheses state the overall
average effects we should observe given both propositions taken in
tandem. On a case-by-case comparison of retailer pairs, all the
hypotheses strictly hold, with a single technical exception to H1b,
H1e, and H2 (Firms 2 and 3 when Firm 2 has the higher SLR under
P1). In its most general form, a mixed strategy is a probability dis-
tribution over pure strategies, such that price dispersion may be
reflected across books as well as time (for a discussion of mixed-
strategy interpretations, see Gibbons 1992).
but they include, at most, two types of firms. Iyer and Paz-
gal also consider “partial loyals,” who behave as loyals with
a lower reservation price. In contrast, we model three asym-
metric firms with multiple switcher segments. Therefore,
some of our results differ from those of Iyer and Pazgal and
other models that lack segmented switchers. In particular,
we predict the existence of a high-priced niche strategy for
a small retailer, which we empirically observe. Other mod-
els do not make such predictions for homogeneous goods.
Our model also offers some unique insights into price
strategies when a retailer competes on multiple fronts. The
novel discounting behavior of Firm 2 in P1 completely
draws from the three-firm asymmetry with segmented
switchers. Firm 2 offers two types of discounts: deep dis-
counts to compete with Firm 3 and shallow discounts to
compete with Firm 1. Furthermore, as Figure 3 depicts,
depending on the relative sizes of the switcher segments,
the frequency of deep and shallow discounts varies. Com-
peting with different firms for different switcher segments
enables a retailer to develop a partitioned pricing strategy,
in which the depth and frequency of discounts vary on each
competitive front.
Model Predictions
To demonstrate that our model can explain pricing behavior
in a rich empirical context, we present testable model pre-
dictions and examine them with pricing data from Internet
book retailers. Our model yields price distributions as equi-
librium strategies that depend on the relative SLRs of the
firms.6 Although summary statistics that describe the pro-
motion strategies can be used to test the fit of pricing data in
general, a more robust method is to compare the empirical
and theoretical price distributions themselves. We offer pre-
dictions based on summary statistics in H1 and predictions
based on the price distributions in H2 and H3.
H1: On average, retailers with a higher SLR have (a) lower
average prices, (b) higher standard deviations in prices, (c)
more frequent discounts, (d) a higher maximum discount
frequency, (e) greater discount depth, and (f) a greater
maximum discount depth.
Under the model’s propositions, firms with a higher SLR
will have lower average prices (H1a) and a higher standard
deviation in prices (H1b) in relation to price deviation from
the reservation (regular) price. The frequency of price dis-
counts is related to the likelihood that a retailer will price
below the maximum retail price. Under P1, Firms 2 and 3
will discount more frequently than Firm 1, and under P2, a
firm with a higher SLR will promote more frequently than a
firm with a lower SLR. Overall, a firm with a higher SLR
will discount at least as often as a firm with a lower SLR
and therefore will discount more frequently (H1c) and have
a higher maximum discount frequency (H1d), on average.
From our model, a firm with a lower price support will
tend to have a greater depth of discount. Under P1, for
example, Firm 2 has a greater probability of discounting at
a lower price than Firm 1, as evidenced in the CDF plot of
Figure 1, Panel B. Across all possible conditions of the
model’s propositions, we expect to observe that, on average,
retailers with higher SLRs will have greater discount depth
(H1e) and a greater maximum discount depth (H1f).
Although summary statistics of retailers’ prices can
indicate whether the SLR explains price promotions, a more
rigorous test would consider the entire price dispersion
curve. Theoretically, we have clear predictions about how
equilibrium price distributions should appear (Figures 1 and
2). We test whether the empirical price distributions vary as
predicted by analyzing stochastic dominance. For any two
CDFs, Fj(x) first-order stochastically dominates Fi(x) iff
Fj(x) ≤ Fi(x), ∀x. In other words, if Firm j’s price CDF lies
nowhere above and somewhere below Firm i’s distribution,
Firm j first-order dominates. In Figure 1, Panel B, for exam-
ple, Firm 1 first-order stochastically dominates Firms 2 and
3, and Firm 2 dominates Firm 3. First-order dominance is a
fairly strict standard when considering empirical price dis-
tributions that may include shocks or random error. Second-
order stochastic dominance is similar except that it consid-
ers the deficit functions, or the integral of the CDF.
Second-order stochastic dominance holds under first-order
dominance, but not vice versa. Our model predicts that, on
average, a firm with a lower SLR will stochastically domi-
nate a firm with a higher SLR.
H2: The price distributions of retailers with a lower SLR first-
and second-order stochastically dominate firms with a
higher SLR.
H2 addresses the relationship between SLR and price distri-
butions among all retailers, and H3 more narrowly focuses
on retailers with the smallest loyal segment size (Firm 3).
Small retailers with a high SLR should discount heavily
(P1), whereas small firms with a low SLR should price high
(P2). Therefore, we can distinguish the pricing strategies of
small retailers according to their SLR values.
H3: The price distributions of small retailers with a high SLR
are first- and second-order stochastically dominated by
small firms with a lower SLR.
Empirical Methodology Overview
We test the predictions of our modeling effort by using pric-
ing data collected for online book retailers. A book is a
homogeneous product that is uniquely identified by an
ISBN (International Standard Book Number), a classifica-
tion that is widely used and recognized by both customers
and sellers. To ensure that the online retailers in our data set
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7These sources consisted of four book lists that were publicly
available on the Internet: (1) 140 books from the Publisher’s
Weekly bestsellers list on June 4, 2001; (2) 730 books from “One
Book List: Collaborative Books to Read,” a list compiled by the
Usenet newsgroup (see rec.arts.books); (3) 60 books from the Lat-
est Acquisitions by Government Environmental Library 2001; and
(4) 1277 books bought by Sidney Sussex University Library in
2001.
8Empirical studies strive to use a “large enough” number of
periods to capture temporal realizations of the mixed strategy. Our
number of periods is similar to that used by others (e.g., Clay,
Krishnan, and Wolff 2001; Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal 1990),
though we use daily rather than weekly data to minimize system-
atic price adjustments. We examined three- and six-month versions
of the data set (87 and 184 days, respectively), and the overall
results and conclusions were the same. We then repeated our
analyses after eliminating bestseller books from the sample. Best-
sellers typically have more price dispersion and are more likely to
be traffic generators than nonbestsellers (Clay, Krishnan, and
Wolff 2001). Our hypotheses remain significantly supported if
bestsellers are eliminated.
share at least a common switcher segment, we collected
daily data on book prices from all the retailers listed on the
price comparison site mySimon. In the period during which
our data were collected, mySimon was the leading price
comparison engine, with 80% of the price comparison site
visit market share (Media Metrix and Nielsen//NetRatings;
see also Allen and Wu 2002; Koças¸ 2002). Our considera-
tion of booksellers listed on mySimon establishes the exis-
tence of a “fully informed” switcher segment (s123 in our
model), without precluding the existence of other switcher
segments. Prices reported on mySimon are taken directly
from each retailer’s Web site, reflecting the book’s offered
price to all shoppers at that time, net of shipping and han-
dling costs.
Internet Retailer Pricing Data
We compiled a sample of 2207 books from various
sources.7 From June 2001 to August 2002, we collected
daily price data on these books from all the bookstores
returned by a search on mySimon. Eliminating duplicates
and books not carried by any of the mySimon bookstores
left 1640 books. We prefer that price changes in the data
reflect the mixed-strategy discounting of retailers rather
than systematic changes from price shocks (e.g., net price
changes due to a switch over to free shipping) or reservation
price changes. Price data collected over longer periods have
a greater risk of being contaminated by systematic price
adjustments. To alleviate this problem, our empirical analy-
ses use daily pricing data on the 1640 books for a period of
26 days in June 2002. This month represents the most
recent period for which we have complete data from all the
retailers and no systematic price adjustments. This 26-day
window also spans a relatively short period to minimize
reservation price adjustments.8
In our June 2002 sample period, 28 unique mySimon
retailers carried at least 1 of the 1,640 books. All books in
the sample were offered by multiple retailers. To compare
retailers that carry a similar assortment of books, we ranked
the booksellers with respect to the percentage of books they
carried from the total list of 1640. We observed a gap
9Figure 4 shows normalized prices for all books across all days.
From our model, a retailer that stochastically dominates another
retailer for one book should do so for all books (only the reserva-
tion price varies across books). Thus, we examine price distribu-
tions across both books and time to test for stochastic dominance.
between the top 14 retailers, which carried at least 40% of
the books, and the bottom 14 retailers, which carried, at
most, only 9% of the books. On the basis of this observa-
tion, we limit our analyses to the 14 retailers that carried at
least 40% of the books. The final sample of retailer prices
has 392,245 total observations, or an average of approxi-
mately 28,000 per retailer.
Price Promotion Measures and Dispersion
For each retailer, we calculate various measures of price-
discounting activity. We do so with the view toward price
discounts reflecting price changes over time. During June
2002, each book had a sequence of daily retailer prices.
Average price for any retailer is the average of all normal-
ized prices for that retailer; we calculate normalized prices
by dividing any given book price by the highest price
quoted for that book by any one of the 14 retailers in the
sample period. The standard deviation of the normalized
prices in each sequence, averaged over all the books carried
by the retailer, gives the average standard deviation. For
each retailer, we also count the number of price changes in
our daily data. We then average that figure across all the
books the retailer sold to calculate the average number of
price changes (discount frequency). We find the maximum
by taking the highest number of price changes for the
retailer across books. We calculate the retailer’s absolute
changes in normalized prices, averaged across all books, to
obtain the average and maximum depth of discounts across
books for that retailer.
The summary retailer price statistics appear in Table 2.
Figure 4 presents the empirical CDF of normalized prices
for the 14 retailers. The numbers in parentheses next to each
retailer in the figure refer to the same ordering as in Table
2.9
Study Procedure
Our objective is to observe how the relative SLRs of the
retailers affect their pricing strategies. To form an empirical
proxy of the SLR, we need indicators of retailer-specific
loyal and switcher segment sizes. We conduct two studies.
The first is an exploratory study using readily available
descriptive statistics for the retailers. The advantage of this
approach is that data for all 14 retailers can be obtained, and
the disadvantage is that aggregate retailer descriptives may
inadequately proxy the SLR. The second study uses a large
Internet panel database that tracks all Internet site visits and
purchases for 100,000 panel members. This study’s advan-
tage is the rich set of microlevel data to form switcher and
loyalty measures. However, the database contains informa-
tion on a more limited set of Internet booksellers. Given the
advantages and disadvantages of each study, we present
both as independent tests of our model predictions.
To test H1, we compare the pricing statistics with
retailer SLR values. H2 and H3 relate our model predictions
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TABLE 2
Summary Statistics for the Retailer Prices
Average Maximum Average Maximum
Retailer Average SD Frequency Frequency Depth Depth
Double Discount .669 .0097 2.150 5 .094 .530
TextatCost .749 .0017 .048 3 .003 .223
eCampus .744 .0115 .643 17 .034 .718
a1Books .749 .0008 .124 1 .009 .363
Books-A-Million .834 .0017 .060 5 .003 .251
1Bookstreet.com .935 .0027 .048 2 .002 .100
Amazon.com .829 .0045 .073 5 .004 .260
B&N .870 .0137 .206 4 .012 .351
Page One .742 .0000 .120 2 .000 .045
BookVariety.com .869 .0000 .000 0 .000 .000
Words Worth Books .876 .0046 .140 2 .006 .109
Varsity .919 .0014 .034 1 .002 .091
Worthy .898 .0000 .000 0 .000 .000
Sam Goody .773 .0007 .020 1 .001 .066
Retailer average .818 .0038 .262 3 .012 .222
10The lowest 5% of a retailer’s prices represent prices that are at
least eight standard deviations (in intertemporal terms) below the
average price for each retailer. This procedure reflects the concept
of “almost” stochastic dominance (see Leshno and Levy 2002).
to measures of stochastic dominance. Figure 4 shows that at
the lower price levels, most firms have a small percentage
of observed prices. This observation makes a strict test of
stochastic dominance problematic because a retailer that
may have highly discounted a few books on a few days (of
28,000 prices quoted by the average retailer) distorts the
notion that the same retailer may have relatively high prices
for all other books across all days. Furthermore, the retail-
ers’ CDFs may cross in closely spaced price regions, mean-
ing that neither firm stochastically dominates the other.
Therefore, to test H2 and H3, we eliminate the 5% lowest
prices quoted by each retailer and consider retailer pairs in
which stochastic dominance is evident.10
Exploratory Study with Retailer
Descriptive Data
The model’s findings relate retailer pricing to the SLRs (H1
and H2) and reveal different strategies for small retailers
depending on their SLR values (H3). To identify the rela-
tively small retailers, we examine reach and link popularity,
which capture a retailer’s number of visitors and Internet
connectivity. Reach measures the number of users who visit
a given Internet site and can be obtained from Alexa. Link
popularity refers to the total number of links that a site has
across the Internet. We measure link popularity as the sum
of all retailer links found by the search engines AlltheWeb,
AltaVista, Google/AOL, HotBot/Inktomi, and MSN. More
specific to booksellers, we measure book-link popularity as
the number of sites that link to a book retailer and contain
the word “book” on the same page in which the link
appears, which we determined using AltaVista. Table 3 pre- 11Several studies (e.g., Bucklin and Sismeiro 2003; Danaher,
Mullarkey, and Essegaier 2006; Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse
2003; Johnson et al. 2004) note a learning effect whereby frequent
visitors become more efficient in browsing over time. However,
this does not mean that frequent (i.e., more loyal) visitors browse
less than infrequent visitors. Danaher, Mullarkey, and Essegaier
(2006) show that more frequent visitors view more pages.
sents the reach and popularity measures for the retailers. As
we expected, Amazon.com and B&N are the largest retail-
ers by these measures. Books-A-Million has the third-
largest reach and popularity, with a book-link popularity
comparable to B&N. The other 11 retailers are all relatively
small in comparison.
SLR Proxy
A proxy for the SLR should capture a retailer’s relative pro-
portion of switchers and loyal customers. Recent studies
have pointed to page views per user as a measure of online
loyalty (Demers and Lev 2001; Goldfarb 2002). Page views
per user, which we obtained from Alexa, are the average
number of unique pages viewed per user by site visitors
each day. Research has examined the drivers of trust and
loyalty in online shopping, and Web site navigation issues
arise as important factors (e.g., Bart et al. 2005; Shankar,
Smith, and Rangaswamy 2003; Srinivasan, Anderson, and
Ponnavolu 2002). Navigating Web site information for in-
depth content increases satisfaction and loyalty (Shankar,
Smith, and Rangaswamy 2003). Demers and Lev (2001)
and Danaher, Mullarkey, and Essegaier (2006) find that
page views per user are positively correlated with the fre-
quency of visits, and frequent visitors tend to be more likely
to purchase (Moe and Fader 2004a). More page views can
also be associated with “lock-in,” or an unwillingness to
switch sites (Bucklin and Sismeiro 2003).11 Thus, the page-
views-per-user metric represents a reasonable proxy for
loyalty, given its association with in-depth navigation and
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TABLE 3
Exploratory Study Measures for the Retailers
Reach/
Millions Link Book-Link Page Views Search Normalized SLR
Retailer per Day Popularity Popularity per User Share Page Views SLR Tier
Double Discount 16.5 16,371 100 2.6 1.0 .377 2.65
TextatCost 24.5 61,585 2897 3.3 1.0 .478 2.09 High
eCampus 75.5 37,418 1998 3.4 1.0 .493 2.03
a1Books 6.3 25,693 4173 3.5 .7 .507 1.38
Books-A-Million 81.0 164,506 56,890 5.3 .9 .768 1.17
1Bookstreet.com 6.65 34,239 6722 2.7 .4 .391 1.02
Amazon.com 23,600.00 57,347,588 3,676,495 6.8 1.00 .986 1.01 Medium
B&N 1775.0 839,878 46,155 6.2 .9 .899 1.00
Page One 1.5 9925 274 2.4 .3 .348 .86
BookVariety.com 1.0 184 24 1.0 .1 .145 .69
Words Worth Books 2.85 20,409 1309 2.6 .2 .377 .53
Varsity 8.85 31,589 1923 3.9 .3 .565 .53 Low
Worthy 4.4 19,999 206 1.8 .1 .261 .38
Sam Goody 63.0 38,012 271 6.9 .1 1.000 .10
Retailer average n.m. n.m. n.m. 3.7 0.57 .54 1.10
Notes: n.m. = not meaningful, given extraordinary values for Amazon.com and B&N.
12These book price comparison sites are the top nine sites that
identify the booksellers from which they quote prices, as ranked
by Google, BookFinder.com, AddAll.com, BestBookDeal.com,
AllBookstores.com, TextbookLand.com, AAABookSearch.com,
CampusBooks, Compare Shop Books, and ANYBOOKSFOR-
LESS.com. We did not include other general price comparison
sites beyond mySimon, because mySimon represents more than
80% of all price comparison activity conducted on the Internet.
loyalty behaviors typically absent from price-sensitive
switchers.
To form an indicator of the relative switcher generation
potential of the retailers, we observe that a bookstore that
wants to attract more switchers may be listed more often in
a price comparison query. For a particular set of price com-
parison sites, we formulate a retailer’s search share as the
proportion of price comparison sites that return prices for
that retailer. Greater search share means that the retailer is
listed on more book price comparison sites and thus may
attract more switchers from various segments. Although
search share does not differentiate switcher segment sizes, it
gives a firm-specific indication of switcher intensity (SLR
incorporates the sum of a retailer’s switcher segment sizes).
We use the nine top-ranked book price comparison sites and
mySimon to formulate a list of price comparison sites for
books.12 There are several reasons a firm might be listed in
a price comparison engine. Sometimes, a price comparison
site uses a retailer’s prices without specific action on the
part of the retailer. In addition, relatively high-cost retailers
are not necessarily absent from price comparison sites. A
firm with comparably higher prices may want greater
access to all potential buyers, and therefore it may share its
pricing data with the search engine (Iyer and Pazgal 2003).
Whether retailers are high priced or low priced, those listed
in price comparison sites have access to a greater number of
switchers. Therefore, the degree of participation in price
13The inverse of page views has no significant pricing correla-
tions, but search share (the numerator of SLR) has significant cor-
relations with some pricing variables. We also analyzed the corre-
lations of the pricing statistics with reach and link popularity after
omitting Amazon.com and B&N because of their high values. The
correlations remain nonsignificant, except for a positive correla-
tion of .64 (p < .05) between reach and maximum discount fre-
quency. The page view measures for Amazon.com and Sam
Goody may reflect more than book searches by consumers. Delet-
comparison engines serves as an indicator of the retailer’s
access to switchers who become informed of its prices.
Given these measures, we form a proxy measure of SLR
(φi) as the ratio of search share (a switcher metric) to the
normalized page views per user (a loyalty metric). Values
appear in Table 3, which orders the retailers by decreasing
SLR. Note that the three largest retailers—Amazon.com,
B&N, and Books-A-Million—have SLRs in the middle
range. For the smaller firms, the SLR separates those with a
high SLR (e.g., eCampus) from those with a low SLR (e.g.,
Varsity), enabling a test of H3. For example, although
eCampus and Varsity have nearly the same popularity and
page views per user, the SLR is higher for eCampus than
for Varsity. We now show empirically that the relative SLRs
explain the discounting behavior of the retailers, consistent
with our model predictions.
Analysis of Pricing Strategies
To test the expected price relationships under H1, we use
the firms’ SLRs along with the pricing data from Table 2. In
regression analyses for the 14 retailers studied, we use a
price statistic as the dependent variable and SLR as the
independent variable. By definition, the resultant standard-
ized coefficient of the SLR and its significance are identical
to the Pearson correlation coefficient and its significance.
We report these correlations in Table 4.13 We observe that
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TABLE 4
Correlations of Exploratory Study Variables and Retailer Prices
Observed Price Promotion Statistics
Average Maximum Average Maximum
Predictor Variables Average SD Frequency Frequency Depth Depth
Reach/millions per day .051 .093 –.098 .111 –.093 .067
Link popularity .041 .054 –.097 .107 –.094 .055
Book-link popularity .042 .051 –.098 .108 –.095 .055
Page views per user –.040 .258 –.161 .155 –.134 .185
Search share –.483* .610** .435 .628** .477* .810***
SLR –.673*** .503* .720*** .568** .744*** .791***
Hypothesis H1a H1b H1c H1d H1e H1f
Predicted relationship to SLR – + + + + +
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Notes: N = 14.
the SLR is significantly correlated with the firms’ price dis-
counting. The results support H1, demonstrating that, on
average, retailers with a higher SLR have lower prices (H1a)
and a higher standard deviation (H1b). They also discount
more often (H1c and H1d) and with greater depth (H1e and
H1f). We conclude that a firm’s SLR is a significant predic-
tor of its promotional activity.
Tests of Retailer Price Distributions
For a given pair of retailers, our model predicts that the
retailer with a lower SLR should stochastically dominate
the other. The test is based on a distinct rank ordering of the
14 retailers (see Table 3 and Figure 4). However, the SLR
proxy based on aggregate retailer data may lack a high
degree of precision in distinguishing retailers with com-
parable SLR values. Therefore, we categorize retailers into
three groups with high, medium, or low SLR values and
compare retailers in different SLR tiers.14 The three 
largest retailers have similar SLR values, ranging from 
1.00 to 1.17. Using the spread of .17 as a guideline,
1Bookstreet.com and Page One appear to have SLRs that
are relatively close to those of the three large firms, such
that it is empirically difficult to classify either firm as hav-
ing a clearly higher or lower SLR. This observation reveals
that four Internet booksellers—Double Discount, Textat-
Cost, eCampus, and a1Books—are small retailers with high
SLRs; here, we expect P1 to hold. There are also five small
retailers—BookVariety.com, Words Worth Books, Varsity,
Worthy, and Sam Goody—with lower SLRs; here, we
expect P2 to hold.
Table 3 indicates the tiers of high, medium, and low
SLRs. To test H2, a retailer in a lower tier of SLR should
stochastically dominate retailers in a higher SLR tier. We
can examine 65 total pairs of retailers in different tiers for
stochastic dominance. Of the 40 retailer pairs whose CDFs
15As a robustness check, we repeat the analysis putting Books-
A-Million in the highest SLR tier and Page One in the low-SLR
tier, and again, we find support for H2 (p < .01). We also examine
all 91 pairs of the 14 retailers (a nontiered analysis) and again find
support for H2 (p ≤ .01).
16As a robustness check, we repeat the analysis, treating Page
One as a low-SLR small retailer, and find support for H3 (p < .01).
The results also hold if we place Books-A-Million in the high-
SLR tier, though it is not clear whether it is a small retailer. We
further examine all 36 pairs of the 9 small retailers (a nontiered
analysis) and again find support for H3 (p ≤ .01).
do not intersect, the SLR values correctly predict first-order
stochastic dominance for 32 pairs (80%), in support of H2
(χ2 = 14.40, p < .01). We use the deficit functions (integral
of the CDFs) to test second-order dominance. Of the 49
retailer pairs whose deficit functions do not intersect, the
SLR values correctly predict second-order dominance for
41 pairs (84%), in support of H2 (χ2 = 22.22, p < .01).15 For
retailers exhibiting stochastic dominance over retailers in
the other SLR tiers, the SLR values predict the relative price
dispersions.
To test H3, we examine the price dispersion of small
retailers with high or low SLRs in more detail. Table 3
shows four high-SLR small retailers, which H3 predicts will
be stochastically dominated by the five low-SLR small
retailers. Of the 20 small retailer pairs, 14 (15) have CDFs
(deficit functions) that do not intersect, and the SLR values
correctly predict first-order (second-order) stochastic domi-
nance for all retailer pairs (p < .01).16 Thus, H3 is sup-
ported; the SLR can explain significantly whether small
firms are high-priced niche players or low-priced
discounters.
Exploratory Study Summary
The exploratory study presents evidence that supports the
hypotheses, indicating that a retailer’s SLR explains its
pricing behavior consistent with the model’s predictions.
The SLR is also adept at explaining whether small firms
take a high-priced or low-priced approach. For example, we
can explain why Worthy prices high and a1Books prices
ing these two retailers does not change the nonsignificance of the
page view correlations in Table 4, and the SLR correlations remain
significant, except for the standard deviation in prices (p = .12).
14We thank a reviewer for this suggestion.
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low, though both firms are small in the same homogeneous
goods market. We also test pricing strategies according to
the entire price dispersion curve by using tests of stochastic
dominance. The empirical literature has no clear consensus
on suitable price dispersion constructs (Pan, Ratchford, and
Shankar 2004). The stochastic dominance tests correspond
to the predicted theoretical relationships and represent a
more complete perspective on retailer price dispersion.
As a summary, consider the microcosm of the three
retailers, all dealing in college textbooks: TextatCost,
eCampus, and Varsity. From the retailer information given
in Table 3, Varsity is the smallest retailer of the three in
terms of reach and popularity. Although it experiences simi-
lar page views, it receives a lower search share and reach
than the other two firms. Standard models and predictions
would likely suggest that Varsity take the high-discount
approach as the small firm, but the opposite is true. Varsity
is the premium-priced retailer among the three. This sce-
nario is possible in our model if Varsity has the lowest SLR,
which it does. Furthermore, Varsity carries 89% of the
books from our sample that Amazon.com carries (compared
with only 57% for eCampus and 48% for TextatCost) and
charges higher prices than Amazon.com (see Figure 4). Var-
sity apparently leverages its low SLR into greater assort-
ment while charging high prices.
Despite the supportive results, the exploratory study’s
SLR proxy is not ideal, given that it is based on aggregate
data. Although page views have been associated with loy-
alty traits in prior studies, the correlation may be weak for
purchasing behavior. The search share measure may not
correspond well to retailer-specific switcher sizes, because
it is based on price comparison sites that offer a limited per-
spective on actual switching behavior. Therefore, we con-
duct a second study using a large panel database of Internet
browsing and purchase. This allows for a more microlevel
behavioral construction of loyalty and switcher measures,
albeit for a more limited number of retailers.
Internet Panel Study
The second study uses the comScore 2002 panel data set to
develop switcher and loyal measures. Households in the
Internet panel have their Web-browsing and purchase activ-
ity recorded. Several recent studies have used comScore
data (Danaher 2007; Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse 2003;
17A repeat-purchase measure for loyalty is not feasible given the
few observations for two of the six retailers.
18The price comparison sites checked are those of the search
share measure in the exploratory study.
Moe and Fader 2004a, b; Park and Fader 2004). The data
set we use contains 100,000 panelists in the United States
from June 2002 to December 2002. Data include site
domains visited, number of page views, duration visiting
the site, and transaction data if a purchase is made. The data
set allows us to formulate switcher and loyalty proxies
based on microlevel browsing and purchasing behaviors.
SLR Proxy
We use behavior-based measures to form the SLR proxies.
We focus on Internet booksellers in the data set that
received purchases; a retailer with only browsing activity
would correspond to an undefined SLR. Six retailers for
which we have pricing data had purchases in the panel data:
1Bookstreet.com, Amazon.com, B&N, Books-A-Million,
eCampus, and Varsity. Book purchases were made by 5304
unique panelists at these retailers over the six-month period.
We take a share-of-purchase perspective (e.g., Tellis
1988) that recognizes Internet retailer loyalty as a lack of
search across retailers when making a purchase (Srinivasan,
Anderson, and Ponnavolu 2002), consistent with our
model’s premise.17 A given purchase occasion corresponds
to loyal behavior if no other book retailers or price compari-
son shopbots are searched before purchase or to switcher
behavior if at least one other book retailer or shopbot is
searched before purchase.18 This results in a retailer’s SLR
measure being the ratio of switcher purchase occasions to
loyal purchase occasions. Consistent with prior studies
(e.g., Danaher 2007; Moe and Fader 2004a; Park and Fader
2004), we take a daily perspective on panelists’ purchase
activity in forming the measures.
The retailer data with SLR measures appear in Table 5.
In general, there is a high level of loyal purchases. Johnson
and colleagues (2004) report that Internet book shoppers in
their data set visit approximately 1.2 retailers (compared
with 1.25 in our data) and that 70% are loyal to a single site
(compared with 79% in our study). The SLR values corre-
late well with those of the exploratory study for the six
retailers (r = .85, p = .03). Note that four of the six retailers
correspond to the closely spaced medium level of the
TABLE 5
Retailer Panel Data
Total Average Panel
Purchase Number of Switcher Loyal Data
Retailer Visits Retailers Visited Purchases Purchases SLR
eCampus 72 1.72 37 35 1.06
Books-A-Million 142 1.70 60 82 .73
B&N 1794 1.40 583 1211 .48
Varsity 26 1.23 6 20 .30
1Bookstreet.com 10 1.50 2 8 .25
Amazon.com 5519 1.19 891 4628 .19
Source: comScore (2002; see http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu).
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exploratory SLR (Table 3), and the panel data measure cre-
ates a more distinctive spread in the SLR values (Table 5).
Analysis
Table 6 presents correlations of the comScore-based SLR
proxies with pricing statistics for the six retailers. The com-
Score proxy correlates well with the pricing statistics in the
expected direction. Even with the small number of retailers,
all the correlations are significant, except for the standard
deviation in prices. The results support H1.
Examining the price dispersions among the six retailers,
we find that the comScore SLR values correctly predict
first- and second-order stochastic dominance for 10 of 13
pairs of nonintersecting price distributions (the distribution
of Amazon.com intersects with eCampus and Books-A-
Million). Second-order dominance is correctly predicted for
11 of 15 retailer pairs (no intersecting deficit functions).
These results support H2 (first-order χ2 = 3.77, p = .05;
second-order χ2 = 3.27, p = .07). Only Amazon.com is out
of place in assessing stochastic dominance according to the
comScore SLR values. Thus, for the small retailers, the
SLR values correctly predict whether they are relatively
high or low priced in all cases, consistent with H3.
Summary of Panel Data Study
The comScore data set allows for a microlevel formulation
for a retailer’s SLR. Six retailers represent a small sample
for analysis, but the results support the model’s predictions.
An analysis using a retailer’s loyal segment size instead of
SLR reveals that loyalty alone is incapable of capturing the
retailer’s pricing strategies. The number of loyals does not
correlate significantly with any pricing variable (this result
does not change if Amazon.com and B&N are eliminated as
large outliers). Loyalty alone also poorly explains the price
dispersions, with only 3 of 13 (4 of 15) pairs of retailer dis-
tributions correctly predicted for first-order (second-order)
stochastic dominance. The results reiterate the important
distinction between our segmented-switcher model and
those based on loyalty sizes. We also note that analyses
using only the first two months of the comScore data set to
generate SLR values yield similar results, but 1Book-
street.com is eliminated because of few switchers or loyals.
The reasonable correlation between the SLR proxies of
both studies and the supportive results suggest that a larger
retailer sample would generate similar results. Six retailers
do not allow for definitive conclusions, but we note that
page views from the exploratory study correlate well with
the number of loyals from the comScore data (r = .76, p <
.10), and the search share measure positively correlates with
the number of switchers but not significantly (r = .54, n.s.).
In total, the studies provide evidence that the SLR can
explain pricing strategies, consistent with our model.
Discussion
Price competition among retailers, large and small, involves
fundamental decisions about whether and how often to dis-
count prices. Most theoretical models based on asymmetric
duopolies suggest that small retailers discount to capture
the lucrative switcher market. However, observed price pro-
motion strategies reflect a wide variety of approaches, with
some small retailers pricing high and others discounting
deeply. Our model examines competitive promotional
strategies in an asymmetric oligopoly with segmented
switchers. Reflecting the realistic assumption that price-
sensitive switchers do not necessarily compare prices at all
retailers, switcher segments add an important strategic
dimension beyond asymmetric retailer loyalty. Although
firms may be classified as large, medium, or small with
respect to their loyal segment sizes, this ranking may have
little to do with the price-discounting behavior of the firm.
We find that the firm’s ratio of the relative size of switchers
(consumers who consider the retailer’s prices) to the rela-
tive size of its loyal customers is a better indicator of the
firm’s price-discounting strategy than loyalty alone. Our
model is the first to consider multiple switcher segments,
enabling us to categorize a small or large firm as a heavy or
light promoter under different loyal and switcher segment
compositions. We provide empirical support for our
model’s key predictions in two studies of Internet book-
sellers. The segmented-switcher perspective identifies
whether a small firm will discount, as is usually predicted,
or price high and play the niche. Overall, our model cap-
tures a wide variety of price promotion activity, consistent
with empirically observed price dispersions. We can sum-
marize our key findings as follows:
•Asymmetry, in terms of different loyal segment sizes and the
existence of switcher segments, leads to a multiplicity of dis-
counting strategies. It is possible to categorize when firms
will be frequent or deep discounters using the retailers’ rela-
tive SLRs.
TABLE 6
Correlations of Panel Data SLR Values and Retailer Prices
Observed Price Promotion Statistics
Average Maximum Average Maximum
Average SD Frequency Frequency Depth Depth
SLR –.779* .460 .810* .839** .805* .833**
Hypothesis H1a H1b H1c H1d H1e H1f
Predicted relationship to SLR – + + + + +
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
Source: comScore (2002; see http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu).
138 / Journal of Marketing, May 2008
•A large firm may find it more profitable to offer deeper (shal-
lower) discounts than a smaller firm if the relative share of
switchers for which it competes is large (small).
•For midsize firms, a partitioned discounting strategy—one
that combines frequent shallow and infrequent deep (or infre-
quent shallow and frequent deep) discounts—is possible as a
result of competition on multiple fronts.
•A small firm may find it profitable to price high and play the
niche if the other firms are already intensely competing for
the switcher segments the small firm could serve. A small
firm may also benefit from strategically choosing to limit its
exposure to switchers in the market to reduce the market’s
overall competitive price intensity.
Using data from the online book market, we empirically
validate our model’s key implications. Empirical SLR mea-
sures from two studies significantly explain price dispersion
among retailers, consistent with our model’s predictions.
The first study uses descriptive retailer statistics to proxy
SLR values, and the second study uses a rich set of panel
data to determine the number of retailer customers exhibit-
ing loyal or switching behavior. Both studies support the
pricing hypotheses that result from our model. Our tests of
stochastic dominance are related to the entire price disper-
sion curve, which is more comprehensive than testing sum-
mary price statistics alone.
Managerial Implications
Our results have numerous implications for retailer pricing
strategies. Larger firms often face a dilemma due to having
both a large loyal following and access to a large number of
switchers. The frequency and depth of discounts depend
critically on the mix of switcher segments in the overall
competitive context. When a vast majority of switchers
widely compare prices, the large firm should offer few shal-
low discounts because other firms will more aggressively
discount. In the case in which many small retailers are
ignored by the bulk of the switchers, a large firm may find
itself more deeply discounting to compete with it nearest
rival (e.g., Amazon.com and B&N exhibit moderate levels
of discounting). A midsized firm has considerable flexibil-
ity in its discounting strategy, such as offering frequent and
shallow discounts to compete with the larger retailer but
infrequent and deep discounts to compete with smaller
firms. The midsized retailer should discount often enough
to convince its larger rival to concede some of the switch-
ers, who then behave like loyals to the midsize firm.
Small retailers (even of homogeneous goods) with rela-
tively few loyal customers should not take a deep discount
strategy without carefully assessing its access to price-
sensitive switchers. If awareness is low or switchers are dif-
ficult to reach, a high-priced niche strategy is likely to be
more optimal. However, if a wide switcher market is acces-
sible, the depth of discounts depends critically on the spe-
cific switcher segments. If most switchers widely compare
retailers’ prices, in general, the small retailer should offer
deep discounts. However, if most switchers concentrate on
the larger firms, the small retailer’s discounts should be
shallower or largely nonexistent if its SLR is small.
The results based on segmented switchers imply certain
strategies in how aggressively retailers should reach out to
switchers. A small firm that discounts may choose to limit
its reach among switchers to some degree to reduce overall
price competition. Pursuing fewer switchers can be advan-
tageous for retailers if shallower discounts can be used to
capture the switchers that remain. Notably, mySimon con-
siderably reduced the number of firms from which it quoted
prices after late June 2002, simultaneously increasing its
strength of strategic alliances with its participant stores. By
reducing the number of firms returned as the comparison
set, mySimon helps these participant stores enjoy higher
profits, as our model predicts, while generating higher com-
missions and referral fees for itself.
The existence of multiple, partially informed switcher
segments tends to reduce price competition among the
retailers. Retailers must consider carefully not just their
loyal customers but also the specific composition of the
switcher segments. Acquiring more switchers can be more
or less valuable, depending on the segment to which they
belong. For example, a midsized retailer would often bene-
fit from targeting its switcher acquisition activities toward
its larger rival, given the shallower discounts involved.
Overall, the strategies are more than a simple dichotomy of
acquisition versus retention because a switcher’s value to
the retailer depends on its specific switcher segment.
The importance of switcher segmentation suggests that
managers should carefully measure switching behaviors.
The retailer’s value to the switcher and the likelihood of
acquiring a switcher customer are both important, but so is
the switcher’s segment membership. More complete mea-
surement of prior switching behaviors and switcher seg-
ment sizes relative to loyals is needed (see Rust, Lemon,
and Zeithaml 2004).
Limitations and Further Research
Our model distinguishes between different pricing strate-
gies, such as high-promoter and low-promoter firms, with-
out relying on traffic-building or product differentiation
considerations. A segmented-switcher perspective enables
us to resolve some varied results found in previous models.
We consider this article a unifying extension to stylized
game-theoretic models of price comparison and related
empirical research. However, we also recognize several lim-
itations. By omitting traffic building from our model, we
are unable to observe how segmented switchers alter retail-
ers’ traffic-related strategies. Empirically, our proxies for
the SLR have several difficulties. Although the exploratory
study is supportive, it relies on aggregate descriptive statis-
tics that may not capture microlevel shopping behaviors
(see Bucklin and Sismeiro 2003). The study using com-
Score panel data more directly reflects loyal and switching
behaviors based on a retailer’s individual customers, but the
number of retailers is limited. Future studies could address
a variety of product categories to validate our results more
robustly. Recent research in trust and loyalty for Internet
retailers (e.g., Bart et al. 2005; Shankar, Smith, and Ran-
gaswamy 2003) may suggest other approaches to the loy-
alty component of SLR.
Endogeneity questions also deserve future study.
Retailer pricing strategies may influence the sizes of vari-
ous switcher and loyal segments as opposed to the exoge-
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nous segment sizes in our model. Although our pricing data
represent a limited period with no systematic price adjust-
ments, endogenous customer behavior is a potential limita-
tion. Dynamic analyses that capture changes in a person’s
switcher and loyalty behaviors over time would be fruitful
research (for examples on search behavior, see Bucklin and
Sismeiro 2003; Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse 2003; John-
son et al. 2004; Moe and Fader 2004a, b).
Further research could also extend recent analyses of
Internet shopping agents and firms’ strategies regarding the
degree of price comparison. The work of Iyer and Pazgal
(2003) is an excellent starting point, and our results comple-
ment some of their key findings. The existence of seg-
mented switchers and the varied strategies that result give a
richer context in which firms can contemplate not only
whether to participate in shopping agents but also when to
participate in different sites that reach different switcher
segments. Our results show that segmented switchers can
relax price competition. The implication is that retailers
should think not only about how best to invest in loyalty
building but also about how they can invest in limiting or
expanding switcher segments in relation to other firms in
their market. We hope that our theoretical and empirical
results motivate further research that more precisely cap-
tures not only the retailers’ multiple switcher segments but
also the pricing strategies that result.
Appendix
Under the model assumptions, the profit functions of the
firms are given by the following equation:
where pi represents the price quoted by Firm i, p–i repre-
sents the vector of prices quoted by other firms, and δij
takes values from the set [0, 1] based on the lowest quoted
price. The term δ12 applies to Firms 1 and 2 and equals 1 for
the lower-priced firm, 1⁄2 in the event of a tie in prices, and 0
for the higher-priced firm. The term δ123 applies similarly to
all three firms, but if two firms quote the lowest price, δ123
equals 1⁄2 for those firms and 0 for the other firm. For a
three-way tie in prices, δ123 equals 1⁄3 for all three firms. We
begin with three lemmas that establish properties of the
equilibrium solution (proofs are available on request):
Lemma 1: There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Lemma 2: Let i = {1, 2, 3}, be the best-response strategy
sets (i.e., the set of prices) in the mixed-strategy
equilibrium. There is no gap (p1, p2) within thejoint support where fi(p) ≡ 0 for two
or more firms. That is, at least two firms possess
positive support at any point within the joint sup-
port of prices.
Lemma 3: The CDFs of firms’ prices Fi, i = {1, 2, 3}, are con-
tinuous, except possibly at r. That is, there are no
mass points in the interior or at the lower boundary
of the joint support 
Proposition 1
P1 states that when φ3 > φ1, Firms 1 and 3 have mutually
exclusive price ranges that, when combined, form Firm 2’s
S S S1 2 3* * *.∪ ∪
S S S1 2 3* * * ,∪ ∪
Si*,
π δ δi i i i ip p p n s s( , ) ( ),− = + +12 12 123 123
price range. Firm 2 competes with Firm 3 in the lower part
of its price range and with Firm 1 in the upper part of its
price range. The equilibrium CDFs, Fi(p), of the firms’
prices are given by the following:
where m is Firm 1’s mass point at the reservation price, is
the lower bound of Firm 1’s support, and is the common
lower bound of Firm 2’s and Firm 3’s supports given by the
following:
Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 1, there is no pure strategy. A detailed exposi-
tion of mixed-strategy solution mechanics for models simi-
lar to ours is found in the work of Narasimhan (1988). We
first define the upper and lower boundaries of the firms’
supports. The upper bound of the feasible price set is r.
Prices higher than the reservation price will result in no
sales, whereas positive profits are possible when the reser-
vation price is quoted. Therefore, the highest price that any
firm can charge is the common reservation price r. To deter-
mine the lower boundaries, there will likely be two price
regions. The lower price region is where only Firms 3 and 2
compete, with an upper bound determined by the lowest
price that Firm 1 will quote. The higher price region is
determined from this price upward. The minimum price for
any firm is when it is indifferent between selling only to its
loyals and offering a deep discount to capture the switchers.
The minimum prices are = nir/(ni + s12 + s123) for
Firms 1 and 2 and = n3r/(n3 + s123) for Firm 3. Because
n1 > n2 > n3, it is always true that Under P1’s
assumption that we must consider two cases of
whether Firm 3’s minimum price is less than or greater than
that of Firm 2.
Under the condition that Firm 2 can
compete with Firm 3 at prices below such that both
Firms 2 and 3 have positive support below Therefore,
Firm 1 cannot capture the switcher segments with certainty,
even if it prices at This conclusion means that the low-p1min.
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est price to which Firm 1 is willing to discount, must be
higher than to balance the prospect of receiving fewer
switchers in expectation. Denoting Fi(p) as the cumulative
distribution probability of Firm i’s prices, we equate Firm
1’s profit selling only to its loyals and its profit when also
selling to the switchers at given the probability that
Firms 2 and 3 quote higher prices:
At prices lower than Firms 2 and 3 compete for seg-
ment s123, and Firm 2 receives all of segment s12 with cer-
tainty. Firm 3 has the lowest minimum price, so it will find
it profitable to include as a lower support bound only the
lowest price Firm 2 will quote. However, because Firm 2
also competes with Firm 1 for s12 and Firm 1 has a lower
support above Firm 2 may find it profitable to adapt a
lower support that is higher than Thus, Firms 2 and 3
will compete with prices at least up to In doing so, they
share a common lower bound which may be higher than
To establish the equilibrium profits, all firms can guar-
antee the profit nir by choosing to price at r. However, in
terms of undercutting other firms and serving the switcher
segment, Firms 2 and 3 are at an advantage. Firm 3 can
improve its profit above n3r by pricing at the lowest price
any other firm ever discounts, and serving s123, which
results in a profit of for Firm 3. Pricing below
is never optimal for Firm 3, because it could then raise
its price and still capture s123 for sure. Similarly, Firm 2 can
improve its profit above n2r by pricing at the minimum
price Firm 1 will ever feasibly reduce its price to, and
serving s12, which results in a profit of for Firm
2. The equilibrium solution reveals that Firm 2 would never
deviate and price below the lower bound because it
would lose more profit from selling at a lower price to s12
and n2 than it could gain by capturing s123 with higher
probability.
When Firms 2 and 3 compete with prices between 
and both have lower prices than Firm 1 with a probabil-
ity of 1. Thus, either one can capture the switcher segment
s123 if it can price lower than the other. The competition in
this interval is similar to Narasimhan’s (1988) base model,
with two exceptions. First, the upper limit of the interval is
not r, but rather which is less than r. Second, Firm 2 also
considers that whenever it prices in it will serve the
switcher segment s12 with a probability of 1. Firms 2 and 3
will randomize their prices in this interval so that the
expected profit will be equal to their equilibrium profits. We
can write the equilibrium conditions for the interval
with the exception of as follows:
Note that in Equation A1, Firm 2 serves its loyal seg-
ment and switcher segment s12 with any price it quotes. It
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p1, serves switcher segment s123 only if its price is lower than
Firm 3’s price. In Equation A2, Firm 3 serves its loyal seg-
ment with any price it quotes, but it serves switcher segment
s123 only if its price is lower than Firm 2’s price. Although
attempts to price low in this interval increase Firm 2’s
chances of serving s123, they also decrease Firm 2’s guaran-
teed profit from s12. Thus, because both
firms will share as the lower bounds of their supports, as
in the work of Narasimhan (1988). This also means that nei-
ther firm will have a mass point at because in that case,
the other firm would have a motivation to undercut 
Therefore, and both equal zero.
To solve Equations A1 and A2, we also need to specify
values for and Note that is the lowest price Firm 1
will quote. Thus, the profit Firm 1 makes with the price 
must be equal to its expected profit:
By solving Equations A1, A2, and A3 simultaneously, in
combination with the cumulative distribution conditions at
we find the solutions to this set of equilibrium condi-
tions in the interval with the exception of as
follows:
On the basis of this solution set, we also observe that 
equals 1, thus showing that in the next interval, upward of
only Firms 1 and 2 will compete. Furthermore, the solu-
tion holds as long as because otherwise, Firm 1
would have an incentive to discount below For n1 ≥ n2 +
s12 + n3(s12/s123), will never exceed In general,
Lemma 2 proves that there are no gaps in the support.
Lemma 3 proves continuity in the distribution functions.
To solve for the pricing behavior in the next support
interval we write the equilibrium conditions, with
the exception of r, as follows:
where is the conditional CDF given that for
Firm 2. Firm 2’s unconditional CDF in the interval is
given by The solution to this set
of equations gives the final results, where the mass point for
Firm 1 at r is a straightforward calculation, given F1(p):
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This concludes the solution for 
For the second case of (i.e., φ2 ≥
φ3 > φ1), the mixed-strategy equilibrium is identical to that
described previously for (the proof is
available on request). Q.E.D.
Proposition 2
P2 states that when φ3 ≤ φ1, only Firms 1 and 2 discount,
whereas Firm 3’s price is set at r. The resultant CDFs are as
follows:
Proof of Proposition 2
Under Firm 3 has the highest minimum
price and thus has no advantage in offering deep enough
discounts to serve the switcher segment s123. However,
Firms 2 and 3 will be competing for the business of s12 and
s123. Compared with Firm 1’s position in P1, Firm 3 is
essentially a high-priced niche player that serves only its
loyals. Firm 3 will not serve segment s123, because both
Firm 1 and Firm 2 quote lower prices with positive proba-
bility as they compete for s12. Thus, the candidate equilib-
rium profits for Firms 1, 2, and 3 are n1r, (n2 + s12 + 
s123) and n3r, respectively. Although Firm 2 can offer
the lowest price, it will never discount below the price
at which it can successfully capture both switcher segments.
In this case, Firms 1 and 3 have equilibrium profits they
would make from sales to their loyal segments only. For
Firms 1 and 2, we solve as follows:
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The solution to this set is as follows:
To show that Firm 3 will indeed never discount in equi-
librium, the lowest price Firm 3 will ever quote is At
this price, its expected profit is represented by the following:
Inserting values from Equations A12 and A13 into Equation
A14, we indeed find that < n3r, which means that
Firm 3 will never price at given that Firms 1 and 2 are
already competing for the switcher segments below this
price. In addition, because it is only Firms 1 and 2 that can
compete at —and possibly above, as we have just
shown—the CDFs presented by Equations A12 and A13
will also remain valid above We can solve for the low-
est price point above to which Firm 3 will ever reduce
its price by solving the following:
The only solution to this equation that rises above 
is r. Thus, given that Firms 1 and 2 are already competing
for the switcher segment below Firm 3 will never
price in the interval Rather, it will only price at r.
Thus, the solutions to Equations A12 and A13 remain valid
until r. With this solution, Firm 1 also has a mass point at r
that equals (n1 – n2)/(n1 + s12 + s123). Although both Firms
1 and 3 have positive masses at r, because Firm 2 has a
lower price than r with a probability of 1, Firms 1 and 3 will
receive their guaranteed profits nir, whereas Firm 2’s profit
will be higher than n2r. Q.E.D.
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p3min ,
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( ) ( )
[ ( )][ (
min min
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F p F p
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